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Abstract
Nonhuman animals show evidence for three types of concept learning: perceptual or similaritybased in which objects/stimuli are categorized based on physical similarity; relational in which
one object/stimulus is categorized relative to another (e.g., same/different); and associative in
which arbitrary stimuli become interchangeable with one another by virtue of a common
association with another stimulus, outcome, or response. In this article, we focus on various
methods for establishing associative concepts in nonhuman animals and evaluate data
documenting the development of associative classes of stimuli. We also examine the nature of
the common within-class representation of samples that have been associated with the same
reinforced comparison response (i.e., many-to-one matching) by describing manipulations for
distinguishing possible representations. Associative concepts provide one foundation for human
language such that spoken and written words and the objects they represent become members of
a class of interchangeable stimuli. The mechanisms of associative concept learning and the
behavioral flexibility it allows, however, are also evident in the adaptive behaviors of animals
lacking language.
Key words: associative concepts, equivalence, within-class representation, many-to-one
matching
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Associative Concept Learning in Animals
Evolution has prepared animals to survive and to reproduce in predictable environments
by predisposing them to perform particular behaviors in specific contexts. Birds are equipped to
build nests and to tend eggs, and cats are prepared to find a mate and to care for their young.
Nevertheless, such predisposed behaviors are often insufficient to ensure survival. Learning
about the predictive relations between events and about the consequences of behavior each give
animals additional, indispensable means to adapt to and survive in complex and ever-changing
environments. Primary stimulus generalization (Hull, 1943; see also Honig & Urcuioli, 1981)
expands these adaptive processes by allowing animals to respond similarly and appropriately to
new events that resemble past events. Yet, even these processes may not be sufficiently broad to
permit animals to benefit maximally from past experience. Adaptation and survival can be
enhanced still further by categorizing diverse experiences on the basis of “similar meaning” –
i.e., on the basis of common associations (e.g., Schusterman, Reichmuth, & Kastak, 2000).
In this paper, we will explore the mechanisms and functions of behavior that arise, not
from physical resemblance (as in the case of primary stimulus generalization), but from
associations with common experiences (what Hull, 1939, 1943 called secondary stimulus
generalization). Our review will underscore the variety of those experiences that can generate
associatively equivalent stimuli. It will also adopt a “common representation” perspective for
some of the phenomena we describe, in order to illustrate how this perspective has guided
systematic research into their controlling variables.
Early on, Miller and Dollard (1941) recognized how categorizing diverse experiences
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contributes to adaptation:
It is sometimes desirable … to be able to learn to generalize from one situation to another
despite the fact that these situations have no external cues in common. For example, the
various enemies surrounding a tribe may not be distinguished by any single physical cue
in common; that is, an enemy may be just as similar to members of the tribe as he is to
other enemies. Nevertheless, it may be desirable … to learn to generalize a given
response, say avoidance, to all enemies.
Such generalization can be mediated by response-produced cues…. The tribesman
may learn … to respond to each of a number of people with the same word, “enemy.” …
This verbal response produces a cue which is common to all these enemies. Once the
response is learned, the cue which it produces may mediate the transfer of other
responses. The tribesman may transfer his various responses of retreating, threatening,
fighting, etc., learned as reactions to one enemy to any other person whom he also calls
an enemy. (pp. 74-75.)
Thus, being able to group objects and events into distinct classes – the essence of
concepts (Keller & Schoenfeld, 1950)

allows one to transfer what one has learned about a

particular object or event to new objects and events (see also Urcuioli, 2013). In a similar vein,
Murphy (2002) proposed that “Concepts are the glue that holds our mental life together … in that
they tie our past experiences together to our present interactions with the world, and because the
concepts themselves are connected to our larger knowledge structures” (Murphy, 2002, p. 1).
Although human concept learning has been extensively studied (see e.g., Murphy’s 2002
volume The Big Book of Concepts), comparative analyses of conceptual behavior in humans and
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other animals has received considerably less attention, at least in some quarters (e.g., The Big
Book of Concepts has no references to research on animal conceptual behavior). A major
contributing factor to this oversight is the lack of a common terminology among the major
research traditions (e.g., see Hampton, 1999) studying the broad topic of concepts, a key notion
for which there has been no generally accepted definition in psychology (see, for example,
Chater & Heyes, 1994; Delius, 1994; Huber, 1999; Lea, 1984; Medin & Smith, 1984; Schank,
Collins, & Hunter, 1986; Thompson, 1995; Wasserman & Bhatt, 1992; Zentall, Galizio, &
Critchfield, 2002). But, the absence of a broadly accepted definition has not deterred research
aimed at understanding the variety of ways in which objects and events can be grouped together
and the benefits that this grouping can convey. Again, Miller and Dollard (1941) used a rather
compelling historical example to illustrate one possible origin and its benefits:
According to the traditional story, Newton was started on his application of the principle
of gravity to celestial mechanics by generalizing a response from a falling apple to the
moon. An apple and the moon are different in many respects, but are similar in that both
are bodies possessing mass. Newton presumably responded on the basis of that similarity.
The response generalized was a verbal one “pulled toward the earth.” (p. 77).
The most important kinds of concept learning for which there is considerable behavioral
evidence in nonhuman animals fall into three categories. The first, perceptual or similarity-based
concept learning, is perhaps the most familiar form in humans; it involves the sorting of stimuli,
like trees or chairs, that share one or more physical properties into classes. Perceptual similarity
also guides the responses of nonhuman animals as it does for humans (see e.g., Wasserman &
Bhatt, 1992; Wasserman, Kiedinger, & Bhatt, 1988), thus demonstrating that this basic kind of
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conceptual behavior is not unique to people. In both human and nonhuman animals, the
development of perceptual concepts appears to be largely under the control of the behavioral
principles of primary stimulus generalization and discrimination (e.g., Mackintosh, 2000; Pearce,
1988; Wasserman et al., 1988).
The second, relational concept learning, involves the relationship between (or among)
objects. One of the most important and interesting examples is sameness/difference, the ability to
report that one object is either the same as or different from another (Wasserman & Castro, 2012,
Wright & Katz, 2006). Although we humans have extensive practice with relational concepts and
they are an integral part of our language, it is clear that under proper conditions, animals too
demonstrate a considerable ability to use relational concepts (Katz, Wright, & Bachevalier, 2002;
Wasserman & Young, 2010; Zentall, Edwards, Moore, & Hogan 1981).
The third, associative concept learning involves the ability to form categories comprising
arbitrary stimuli that are interchangeable with one other in new contexts (e.g., Dougher &
Markham, 1994) because of their prior association with each other or with a common event,
response, or outcome (in humans, e.g., an object and the word for that object). These concepts
are especially interesting because, as Miller and Dollard (1941) noted, they are not based on any
particular physical property or inherent relation among the members of the class, but develop
through experience. In relational frame theory (e.g., Barnes, 1994; Hayes, Barnes-Holmes, &
Roche, 2001), they are examples of “arbitrary applicable relational responding,” the adjective
“arbitrary” indicating that physical resemblance is not required.
The general nature and formation of categories is also relevant to another tripartite
organizational scheme in the realm of human conceptual behavior comprising: subordinate
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concepts, basic-level concepts, and superordinate concepts (e.g., Rosch & Mervis, 1975). This
familiar scheme proposes that human language concepts can be located at three distinctly
different levels, depending on the relative extent of intraclass and interclass stimulus similarity.
A basic-level concept, like chair, enjoys the advantage of high intraclass similarity and low
interclass similarity. A subordinate concept, like dining chair, is more difficult to establish
because, relative to a basic-level concept, it entails much higher interclass similarity. A
superordinate concept, like furniture, is even more difficult to establish because, relative to a
basic-level concept, it entails much lower intraclass similarity, comprising such strikingly
different stimuli as chairs, tables, lamps, rugs, and mirrors (see, for example, Lazareva,
Freiburger, & Wasserman, 2004). Superordinate concepts can clearly be seen to arise from what
we are terming associative classes or concepts, whereas subordinate and basic-level concepts
clearly arise from the more primitive perceptual mechanisms of discrimination and primary
stimulus generalization.
Our review focuses on associative concept learning, given its long-recognized importance
in the comparative analyses of human and animal behavior (e.g., Lea, 1984) and because the
topics of perceptual and relational concept learning have received extensive treatment elsewhere
(e.g., Herrnstein, 1984, 1985; Katz, Wright & Bodily, 2007; Mackintosh, 1995; Wasserman &
Astley, 1994; Wright & Katz, 2006). Although we adopt a representational viewpoint in parts of
our paper, we will not provide a systematic evaluation of the pros and cons of such a perspective
vis-á-vis others. Instead, our goal is to illustrate the wide-ranging phenomena encompassed by
associative concept learning and to systematically consider their origins.
Associative Classes

Associative Concept Learning 8
In contrast to perceptual classes (including subordinate and basic-level concepts), which
share common physical characteristics, the basis for the common response to members of an
associative class (including superordinate concepts) is altogether arbitrary and must be acquired
through training (Hall, 1996; Jitsumori, 2004). The very quality of being arbitrary provides
associative classes with a flexibility that can readily be seen in the extent to which they are used
in human language (e.g. Hayes et al. 2001). An associative class may consist of an object and its
various symbolic representations. For example, the object itself, chair, the spoken word “chair,”
and the written word CHAIR are all members of a common associative class.
A critical characteristic of an associative class lies in the fact that one member of the
class can represent the others – i.e., class members are, within limits, interchangeable with one
another. So, what an individual learns about one member of the class can instantly and
effectively transfer to other members of the class without any further training. For example, to a
young child, the word “dog” may represent an animal having the properties ‘friendly,’ ‘wags its
tail,’ and ‘licks one’s face.’ But, if the child later has an unhappy experience with a dog that
growls and lunges toward the child in the apparent defense of its territory, then the child may add
to its representation of dog the attribute ‘may be aggressive.’ If the animal and the word “dog”
belong to the same associative class, then without further training, the word “dog” may elicit
some of the same anxiety that has been newly associated with the animal itself (e.g., Dymond et
al., 2011).
As another example, consider that children routinely learn to call socks, belts, pants, and
hats “clothing.” This associative process, which probably proceeds by rote memorization, can be a
very protracted affair. Yet, when children later learn that “apparel” is a synonym for “clothing,” they
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are instantly able to call socks, belts, pants and hats items of “apparel,” and do not need to explicitly
learn that each article is a member of the new category.
Hull (1939) recognized the importance of such associative classes and proposed
secondary stimulus generalization as a means of accounting for how classes of disparate
objects/stimuli could develop. He suggested that explicitly learning the same response to a set of
disparate stimuli would generate an equivalence among them, so that new behavior trained to a
subset of the stimulus class would immediately generalize to the remaining, untrained class
members (see, for example, Lowe, Horne, & Hughes, 2005; Molet, Stagner, Miller, Kasinski, &
Zentall, 2013; Spradlin, Cotter, & Baxley, 1973; Urcuioli & Lionello-DeNolf, 2001).
Miller and Dollard (1941) called this process the acquired equivalence of cues to capture
the idea that, via learning, disparate but “equivalent” cues become members of a common class
that are now substitutable for one another. The term “emergent relation” broadly refers to the
ability of a member of such a stimulus class to “… evoke a reaction … with which it has never
been associated” (Hull, 1939, p. 9; see also Shipley, 1935). Indeed, demonstrating emergent or
derived relations is the standard way to establish acquired equivalence specifically and
associative classes more generally (e.g., Astley & Wasserman, 1998, 1999; Lazareva, Freiburger,
& Wasserman, 2004; Roberts & Mazmanian, 1988; Wasserman, DeVolder, & Coppage, 1992;
Vonk & McDonald, 2004).
Our review of research into associative concept learning begins with a consideration of
the differential outcomes effect – a key phenomenon in which otherwise unrelated stimuli are
bound into functional categories because of their pairing with a common outcome.
Establishing Associative Classes: The Differential Outcomes Effect
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In a conditional discrimination, such as matching-to-sample, an initial or sample stimulus
indicates which of two (or more) comparison stimuli is correct. For example, if the sample is a
red light, then the vertical line is correct, whereas if the sample is a green light, then the
horizontal line is correct. In matching-to-sample, when a correct response to each of two
comparison stimuli is followed by a different outcome (e.g., food following a correct response to
one comparison, water following a correct response to the other, a so-called differential
outcomes procedure), acquisition of the task is often faster than a control condition involving
nondifferential outcomes (Trapold, 1970; see also Alling, Nickel, Poling, 1991; Estévez , 2005;
Urcuioli, 2005). Furthermore, with differential outcomes, inserting a delay between the offset of
the sample stimulus and the onset of the comparison stimuli typically results in higher delayed
matching accuracies than for a nondifferential outcomes condition (Brodigan & Peterson, 1976;
see also Hochhalter et al., 2000).
In the animal literature, the differential outcomes effect has been interpreted as evidence
that outcome expectancies conditioned to the sample stimuli associated with the different
outcomes acquire cue properties over and above the samples themselves (Overmier & Linwick,
2001; Peterson, 1984; see also Overmier & Lawry, 1979). More important for the present
purposes is that different stimuli signaling the same outcome become functionally equivalent.
For example, Peterson trained pigeons on a conditional discrimination involving
differential outcomes of food for a correct response following a sample of one color and a tone
for a correct response following a sample of a different color. On other trials, there was single
stimulus training in which one shape was followed by food and another shape was followed by
the tone. When the pigeons were later tested on trials in which the shapes replaced the colors as
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samples in the conditional discrimination, positive transfer was found relative to control groups
for which differential outcomes were not associated with both pairs of stimuli. Similarly,
following training with two identity matching tasks (one involving colors, the other shapes)
using differential outcomes of two different kinds of grain (e.g., corn following correct responses
to one color and wheat following correct responses to the other; corn following correct responses
to one shape and wheat following correct responses to the other), positive transfer was observed
when the samples from the two tasks were subsequently interchanged (Edwards, Jagielo, Zentall,
& Hogan, 1982). Moreover, these transfer results closely resembled similar findings observed in
humans (e.g., Dube et al., 1989; Maki, Overmier, Delos, & Gutman, 1995).
In behavior analysis, results such as these have been viewed in terms of stimulus class
formation – viz., stimuli associated with the same reinforcing outcome become members of the
same class (e.g., Dube et al., 1989; Urcuioli, 2013). In the animal conditioning and cognition
literatures, however, researchers have asked: “What specific cues mediate these transfer effects?”
One possibility is differential sample responding arising from the sample-outcome associations,
given that differential sample responding is known to control comparison choice in other
paradigms (Urcuioli & Honig, 1980). In fact, Urcuioli and DeMarse (1994) have reported
evidence that cues produced by differential sample responding was sufficient to mediate transfer
when samples from a differential-outcomes conditional discrimination are replaced with other
stimuli associated (off baseline) with differential sample responding, but with nondifferential
outcomes.
In most demonstrations of the differential outcomes effect in nonhuman animals, the
different outcomes have differed in quantitative or qualitative value, for example, 1 versus 5
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pellets of food (Carlson & Wielkiewicz, 1972), 1.0 versus 0.2 probability of a food outcome for a
correct choice (DeLong & Wasserman, 1981; Kruse & Overmier, 1982), food versus water
(Honig, Matheson, & Dodd, 1984), or two different kinds of grain (e.g., wheat versus corn;
Edwards et al., 1982). Such differences may encourage differential sample behavior.
Yet, even if overtly different sample responding does not develop in a differential
outcomes task, the fact that the outcomes are likely to differ in their hedonic value (i.e., one is
typically preferred over the other) may lead to differences in the hedonic values of the samples
that predict those outcomes. For example, Astley, Peissig, and Wasserman (2001; also see Astley
& Wasserman, 1998, 1999) found transfer of training between samples associated with one set of
differential outcomes (1 vs. 5 pellets) and other samples associated with another set of
differential outcomes (1- vs. 15-s delay of reinforcement). The sole basis for the transfer would
appear to have been the differential hedonic value of the outcomes (i.e., 5 pellets and a 1-s delay
of reinforcement would have been relatively “good” outcomes, whereas 1 pellet and a 15-s delay
of reinforcement would have been relatively “poor” outcomes).
Similar transfer effects were found by Friedrich and Zentall (2010) using differential
responding (5 pecks vs. 20 pecks) to one pair of comparison stimuli given one pair of samples
and different probabilities of reinforcement (0.2 reinforcement vs. 0.8 reinforcement) following
correct responses to a different pair of comparison stimuli given a different pair of samples.
Thus, pigeons showed transfer of training when the samples associated with 20 or 5 comparisonstimulus pecks were now paired, respectively, with comparisons associated with 0.2 and 0.8
reinforcement and vice versa. Specifically, the low probability of reinforcement sample was
interchangeable with the high fixed-ratio sample and the high probability of reinforcement
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sample was interchangeable with the low fixed-ratio sample (cf. Azrin, 1961; Flora, 1969).
Astley et al. (2001; also see Astley & Wasserman, 1999) noted that differences in the
hedonic value of different outcomes affected how pigeons responded to the sample stimuli
themselves, although the authors reported evidence that their pigeons’ differential response rates
did not accurately predict their comparison choice behavior. More directly, Frank and
Wasserman (2005b) found that differential responding (a required low rate of pecking vs. a
required high rate of pecking) to stimuli associated with similar outcomes did not transfer to
comparison stimuli that were associated with differential outcomes (1 vs. 9 pellets of food) and
that supported differential responding to other sample stimuli.
Zentall and Sherburne (1994) attempted to control for differential sample responding in a
differential outcomes procedure with pigeons by periodically inserting reinforced presentations
of the sample to which fewer responses were made. In spite of the fact that sample response rates
were now effectively equated, a strong differential outcomes effect was nevertheless obtained.
Thus, it seems more likely that comparison choice was controlled by the anticipation of
outcomes with different hedonic values than by overtly different sample responding.
Equating hedonic value can be accomplished by scheduling different arbitrary cues
ending in the same reinforcer. To do so, Miller, Friedrich, Narkavic, and Zentall (2009) trained
pigeons on a matching task in which a blue houselight followed correct responses to one
comparison stimulus and a tone followed correct responses to the other comparison stimulus
prior to food presentations. When pigeons were then tested with delays inserted between the
samples and the comparison stimuli, matching accuracy was significantly higher for the
differential houselight-outcomes group than for a control group in which the houselights were
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uncorrelated with the sample stimuli. Thus, samples and correct comparisons paired with
arbitrary cues preceding a common food outcome facilitate matching performance, suggesting
the possibility of an associative class involving the sample, the correct comparison stimulus, and
the arbitrary outcome (see also Fedorchak & Bolles, 1985; Kelly & Grant, 2001).
Establishing Associative Classes: Many-To-One Mapping
Transfer of training. Associative classes can be established without differential outcomes
simply by mapping two or more sample stimuli onto the same reinforced comparison stimulus in
a conditional discrimination, a procedure called many-to-one (MTO) or comparison-as-node
matching (Saunders, Saunders, Williams, & Spradlin, 1993; Urcuioli, Zentall, Jackson-Smith, &
Steirn, 1989; Wasserman et al., 1992). For example, choosing a set of vertical lines by pigeons
might be reinforced if the sample is either a red light or a set of vertical lines, whereas choosing a
set of horizontal lines might be reinforced if the sample is either a green light or a set of
horizontal lines. Although the red and vertical-lines sample are separately paired with the
vertical-lines comparison, and similarly for the other two samples paired with the horizontallines comparison, their potential membership in a common associative class can be evaluated by
an independent test. As in the case of the child learning new characteristics of a dog, and then
demonstrating transfer of such new learning to the word “dog,” we can ask if new comparison
choices (e.g., choosing between a large circle versus a small dot) acquired by a pigeon for two of
the original samples (e.g., red and green) would transfer to the two remaining samples (i.e.,
vertical and horizontal lines). The design of this experiment is presented in Table 1 (Urcuioli et
al., 1989, Experiment 2).
In fact, most pigeons in this experiment showed evidence of transfer (i.e., of emergent
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relations between the line-orientation samples from original training and the comparisons from
interim training, see Figure 1). In other words, most pigeons behaved as though the hue and line
samples that occasioned the same reinforced comparison choice in MTO matching belonged to
the same associative class by preferentially selecting the “class-consistent” comparisons on the
line-sample test trials. The results from experiments with human participants (Delamater &
Joseph, 2000; Molet et al., 2012; Wasserman & DeVolder, 1993) and from conceptually similar
experiments with rats (Honey & Hall, 1989) have supported similar conclusions.
Again, what specific “cue” (cf. Miller & Dollard, 1941) could be the basis of these
emergent stimulus relations? Urcuioli et al. (1989), working within the animal memory literature,
suggested that pigeons had commonly represented or “coded” (cf. Lawrence, 1963) samples that
were associated with the same comparison stimulus. In general terms, MTO training altered the
way in which the organisms implicitly responded to those samples. To test this hypothesis,
Zentall, Urcuioli, and their associates conducted a series of experiments to obtain convergent
evidence regarding the existence and nature of such common representation(s).
Delayed matching tests. Evidence consistent with the development of common
representations was obtained by comparing retention functions when a delay was inserted
between the sample and comparison stimuli. Typically, hue-sample retention functions for
pigeons are generally much shallower than line-sample retention functions (i.e., as the delay
increases, matching accuracy is better maintained when the samples are hues) (Farthing, Wagner,
Gilmour, & Waxman, 1977; Urcuioli et al., 1989; Wasserman, Bhatt, Chatlosh, & Kiedinger,
1987; Zentall, Urcuioli, Jagielo, Jackson-Smith, 1989). However, the corresponding hue-sample
and line-sample retention functions following MTO training are quite similar (i.e., they have
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comparable slopes) (see Figure 2; Urcuioli et al., 1989, Experiment 1; Zentall et al., 1989), a
result consistent with the hypothesis that samples associated with a common comparison
stimulus are commonly represented.
Interference/facilitation effects. Another source of converging evidence for the
establishment of associative classes following MTO matching training was reported by Zentall,
Sherburne, and Urcuioli (1993; see also Lippa & Goldstone, 2001). Zentall et al. (1993) initially
trained pigeons on MTO matching with hue and line samples after which two of the samples (the
hues) from original training were associated with new comparison stimuli (cf. Table 1, Interim
Training). Later, delays were inserted between the samples and comparisons on each trial, and
training was continued until a high level of accuracy was achieved. On subsequent test trials, one
or the other of the remaining samples from original training was presented during the retention
interval, and accuracy was compared with that on control trials without a retention-interval
stimulus (see Table 2).
For pigeons that quickly acquired the more difficult line-sample matching associations
during MTO training, test-trial accuracy increased when the interpolated stimulus was
associatively similar to the sample on that trial (i.e., the interpolated stimulus had been
associated with the same comparison as the sample in MTO training). Conversely, accuracy was
disrupted when the interpolated stimulus was incompatible with the sample stimulus on that trial
(i.e., the interpolated stimulus had been associated with a comparison which was different from
the sample in MTO training). Thus, if one inserts into the delay a sample formerly associated
with the same comparison stimulus as the current sample, then it facilitates delayed matching
accuracy, whereas if one inserts into the delay a sample formerly associated with a different
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comparison stimulus from the current sample, then it disrupts delayed matching accuracy.
Sample discriminability tests. If stimuli which are inherently dissimilar (hues and lines)
are commonly represented by being associated with a common comparison stimulus, then
requiring an explicit discrimination between them should be relatively difficult (cf. Hall, 1996;
Meeter, Shohany, & Myers, 2009). To test this prediction, Kaiser, Sherburne, Steirn, and Zentall
(1997) trained pigeons on a simple successive discrimination involving the four samples from
MTO matching (see Table 3). When the samples that had been associated with the same
comparison were both followed by reinforcement or were both followed by the absence of
reinforcement, acquisition of the successive discrimination was more rapid than the condition in
which those samples signaled different reinforcement contingencies (viz., one was followed by
reinforcement and the other was not; see Figure 3). These results, too, are consistent with the
common representation hypothesis.
Partial- versus total-reversal tests. Further evidence for an associative relation between
samples occasioning the same comparison choice response comes from research involving
partial versus total reversals (Zentall, Steirn, Sherburne, & Urcuioli, 1991; cf. Table 4). If such
samples are commonly represented, then subsequently reversing the sample-comparison relations
for just one pair of samples (e.g., the lines) should yield relatively slow reacquisition. More
specifically, such a partial reversal ought to be slower than if all four sample-comparison
relations are reversed (a total reversal), even though the latter involves twice as many reversed
relations. The rationale for this prediction is that only the total reversal permits the hypothesized
common representations between samples associated with the same comparison to remain intact
(i.e., red and vertical samples would still be associated with a common response, as would green
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and horizontal samples).
The results of this experiment indicated that pigeons took longer to relearn the linesample contingencies of the task when they alone were reversed than when they and the huesample contingencies were also reversed (see Figure 4). Interestingly, the same was not true for
the hue-sample reversal. For this group, there was no retardation of reversal learning produced
by reversing only two of the four sample-comparison associations. This behavioral asymmetry
has theoretical implications (that will be described later) for the nature of the common sample
representation that results from MTO training. For now, it should be noted that this asymmetry
rules out a less interesting alternative account: namely, that total reversals are learned faster than
partial reversals because the change in contingencies for the total reversal is less discriminable
vis-a-vis original training than the change in contingencies for the partial reversal. If
discriminating the change in reinforcement contingencies were solely responsible for the partialversus total-reversal effect, then one would expect comparable retardation for the hue-sample
partial reversal group and the line-sample partial reversal group.
The re-learning disadvantage of partial over total reversals can also be shown when
training involves simple successive discriminations in which two stimuli (e.g., a red hue and a
vertical line) are associated with reinforcement and two other stimuli (e.g., a green hue and a
horizontal line) are associated with the absence of reinforcement. When the outcomes associated
with only the line samples are reversed, acquisition of the reversal is slower than when the
outcomes associated with hue samples are also reversed (Zentall et al., 1991, Exp. 2; see also
Nakagawa, 1986).
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Superordinate categorization. We earlier introduced superordinate categorization as an
important form of associative category learning in humans. Research has now confirmed that
animals too can categorize stimuli at the superordinate level (e.g., Lazareva et al., 2004; Roberts
& Mazmanian, 1988; Wasserman, DeVolder, & Coppage, 1992; Vonk & McDonald, 2004).
In one exemplary experiment, Wasserman et al. (1992) arranged for pigeons to acquire
two arbitrary superordinate categories, each comprising two basic-level categories. These
researchers found clear evidence that new categories of functionally equivalent stimuli could be
learned, thereby supporting the view that much of the richness and complexity of human
conceptual behavior can be found in the behavior of nonhuman and nonverbal animals.
Specifically, Wasserman et al. (1992) devised a three-step experiment to determine whether
pigeons could be encouraged to amalgamate two basic categories into one broader category that
was not defined by any obvious perceptual features. In the first step of the experiment, by
reinforcing responding to two different keys, pigeons were trained to sort slides into two arbitrary
conjoint categories, such as the conjoint category of cars and people and the conjoint category of
chairs and flowers (there were 12 exemplars in each of the four basic-level categories). In the second
step of the experiment, the pigeons were trained to make a new response to only one stimulus class in
each conjoint category. For example, some birds were trained to peck one new key when a car
appeared and to peck another new key when a flower appeared. In the third step involving pecks to
the two new keys, the pigeons were tested with slides from all four stimulus classes to see whether
the conjoint categories that they had learned in the first step would influence their response to the
stimulus classes that had been withheld in the second step (see Bhatt & Wasserman, 1989 for related
research into the role of perceptual resemblance in similar reassignment training and testing).
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Would the birds peck the new key to which cars had been reassigned when a person appeared?
Would they peck the new key to which flowers had been reassigned when a chair appeared?
The average score was 87% correct in the case of stimuli that had been reassigned and 72%
in the case of stimuli that had not been reassigned. So, merely by being associated with a common
response, perceptually disparate stimuli had amalgamated into a new conjoint category of
functionally equivalent stimuli (see also Smeets, Barnes, & Roche, 1997).
What is the Nature of the Common Representation?
Behavior analysts avoid the use of cognitive terminology because they believe that such
terminology is superfluous. If terms like common representation are mere stand ins to denote
stimuli that are members of a stimulus class, then there is indeed no need for nor advantage to
the use of such a term. On the other hand, if common representation is used to refer not only to
stimuli within an associative class but to their potentially identifiable characteristics (e.g., like
those proposed by Miller & Dollard, 1941), then there may be value in its usage. Of course,
trying to identify the nature of those representations, especially in a nonverbal organism, is a
challenging task.
Nevertheless, one can hypothesize about possible candidates and devise experimental
tests based on those hypotheses (Meeter et al., 2009). For example, if two stimuli, A and B, are
each associated with a common reinforced comparison stimulus, C, then one possible common
representation is a prospective representation of Stimulus C. Stated otherwise, seeing either A or
B might activate implicit or explicit anticipatory responses of C (e.g., Grant, 1982; Honig &
Thompson, 1982; Hull, 1939). It is also possible that presentation of one of the samples, say
Stimulus A, activates a representation of the other sample, Stimulus B, a transformed
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retrospective representation of the original stimulus.
The prospective representation hypothesis. Urcuioli (1996) proposed that a common
prospective representation in the form of implicit mediating responses or response intentions (see
also Honig & Wasserman, 1981) can account for the transfer of training results reported by
Urcuioli et al. (1989) According to Urcuioli’s model (see Table 5), after the MTO contingencies
have been learned, presentation of either the red or vertical-line samples evokes the anticipatory
representation of their associated correct comparison stimulus (e.g., circle), and likewise for the
presentation of the green and horizontal-lines samples. During interim training, each sample
stimulus (e.g., red) and the anticipatory representation of the comparison (e.g., the circle) it
continues to evoke (because of continual refresher training on MTO matching) become
conditional cues for reinforced responding to a new comparison stimulus (e.g., blue). Finally, on
test trials, presentation of the vertical-line sample is able to selectively cue a blue-comparison
choice via the link established between the anticipatory (circle) representation and blue during
interim training. In other words, the anticipatory representations presumably mediate the
generalization of the new comparison responses explicitly learned to the samples in interim
training to the remaining, “untrained” samples from MTO matching, resulting in the emergent
relations observed in testing (also see Wasserman et al., 1992).
The prospective hypothesis receives support from the finding that the transfer observed
after MTO and interim training is not observed if pigeons learn the identical sets of conditional
relations prior to training (see Table 6), but organized such that initial training involves one-tomany (OTM) or “sample-as-node” matching (Urcuioli, Zentall, & DeMarse, 1995; see also
Urcuioli & Zentall, 1993). In OTM matching, each sample occasions two different reinforced
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comparison responses (albeit on separate trials). As shown in Table 6, prospective comparison
representations cannot mediate the association between the samples that were first experienced in
Interim Training and the comparison stimuli that were experienced in Original Training, but not
in Interim Training. In sum, different comparison stimuli associated with the same sample
stimuli are generally not interchangeable with one another (although see the results of Pigeons
CG5 and IN1 in Urcuioli et al., 1995 as possible exceptions.)
Interestingly, the absence of interchangeability between “target” stimuli associated with a
common antecedent stimulus may be restricted to conditional choice procedures in animals. For
example, using rats, Sawa and Nakajima (2002) found that, after OTM training in which a
common antecedent flavor preceded (on separate trials) two different target flavors, conditioning
a taste aversion to one target transferred to the other target. Similar findings have been reported
in CER conditioning with rats by Johns and Williams (1998) as well as Hall, Ray and Bonardi
(1993) and in pigeon autoshaping by Bonardi, Rey, Richmond, and Hall (1993). Interestingly,
Hall et al. (1993) offered a frustration-based mediational interpretation of their transfer findings.
In any event, Urcuioli and Lionello-DeNolf (2001) obtained results indicating that
anticipatory mediated generalization (prospective representation) is not necessary to observe the
transfer effects following MTO training. They compared test results from two groups of pigeons.
One group was trained in the fashion depicted in Table 5 (viz., MTO training followed by
interim, two-sample/two-comparison training). A second group, however, was trained on MTO
matching after acquiring the two-sample/two-comparison “interim” task. In testing, both groups
showed comparable levels of transfer performance when they were required to match the
remaining samples from MTO matching to the comparisons appearing in the two-sample/two-
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comparison task. Apparently, then, from a representational viewpoint, other forms of “common
coding” (see below) can yield transfer-of-control effects.
The retrospective representation hypothesis. Although Urcuioli’s (1996) model of
mediated generalization was based on prospective representations of the comparison stimuli
and/or responses, the only representational requirement needed to account for the emergent
relations observed after MTO training is that the mediator be common to both samples (cf.
Urcuioli & Lionello-DeNolf, 2001, Table 4). An alternative to the prospective representation
hypothesis for which there is supportive evidence is the retrospective representation of one of the
samples (Zentall, Sherburne, & Urcuioli, 1995; see also Urcuioli & Zentall, 1986).
Such a common retrospective mediator might take the following form (see Table 7):
During MTO training, red and vertical samples, for example, would both be represented as ‘red,’
and green and horizontal samples would both be represented as ‘green.’ During subsequent
interim training, the red and green samples, coded as ‘red’ and ‘green,’ respectively, would now
be associated with new comparisons. Finally, on test trials, the vertical samples coded as ‘red’
and the horizontal sample coded as ‘green’ should (and do) now occasion the same new
comparison responses that were explicitly associated with red and green during interim training.
Evidence for the retrospective representation of samples following MTO training comes
from two sources. First, as mentioned earlier, evidence for the superiority of total versus partial
reversals reported by Zentall et al. (1991) was found for the partial-reversal group in which only
the line-orientation-sample associations were reversed, but not for the other partial reversal
group in which only the hue-sample associations were reversed. These data are consistent with
the hypothesis that the common retrospective mediators are representations of the hues because,
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for both the partial-reversal hues group and the total reversal group, the associations between the
hue mediators and the comparison stimuli would have to be reversed but the original mediators
would remain functional. For the partial-reversal line group, however, new mediators would
have to be established (the old mediators would still be functional for the maintained hue sample
associations).
This account makes an interesting prediction. On the one hand, the unchanged hue
sample-comparison associations for the partial-reversal lines group should experience very little
disruption (as already noted). However, the unchanged line sample-comparison associations for
the partial-reversal hues group should experience considerable disruption because, for this group,
as the associations between the hue mediators and the comparison stimulus encounter the
reversal contingencies, they should no longer be functional for the line samples and new
mediators would therefore need to develop.
Which sample dimension serves as the basis for the common representation following
MTO training may depend on which samples are more salient (cf. Carter & Eckerman, 1975) or
which of the sample-comparison associations are acquired first. For example, if the hue-sample
associations are acquired first, then the association of the remaining samples (i.e., line
orientations) with those same comparisons may be facilitated if they too are represented as hues.
In support of this hypothesis, Zentall et al. (1993) found that overall fast learners acquired the
hue-sample associations at about the same rate as overall slow learners, but they acquired the
line-orientation-sample associations significantly faster than did the slow learners. If the fast
learners represented the line orientations as hues, then this analysis could account for both the
absence of faster acquisition of the hue-sample associations and the faster acquisition of line-
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orientation-sample associations.
More compelling evidence for retrospective representations comes from research
involving conditional discriminations with samples of food and the absence of food (viz., “no
food”). As noted earlier, food and no-food samples (or, for that matter, any sample dimension
defined by the presence vs. absence of an event) typically yield divergent retention functions
(Colwill, 1984; Grant, 1991; Sherburne & Zentall, 1993; Wilson & Boakes, 1985). Specifically,
the no-food retention function is virtually flat, whereas the food-sample retention function shows
the typical decrement in accuracy with increasing delay intervals.
By contrast, retention functions obtained following training with just hue or lineorientation samples are generally parallel for the two samples from each dimension. Thus, if one
trains pigeons on MTO matching in which food and no-food samples occasion the same
comparison choices as red and green hue samples, respectively, the slopes of the resulting
retention functions can be used to infer the nature of the underlying representations. For
example, if such training yielded parallel food versus no-food-sample retention functions, then
this result would suggest that these samples were represented as red or green hues. Conversely, if
the hue-sample retention functions diverge, then this result would suggest that the hues were
represented as food or no food.
Zentall et al. (1995) found that following MTO training with red/green and food/no-food
samples, the retention functions diverged not only for the food/no-food samples, but for the
red/green samples as well. Importantly, a flat function was observed for the hue sample that
occasioned the same comparison choice as the no-food sample, whereas a decremental function
was observed for the hue sample that occasioned the same comparison choice as the food sample
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(see Figure 5); this outcome is consistent with the hypothesis that samples associated with the
same comparison are commonly represented.
Similar results were reported by Urcuioli, DeMarse, and Zentall (1994) after training
pigeons on MTO matching with three pairs of samples (food vs. no-food, 20 pecks vs. 1 peck,
and red vs. green) mapped onto one pair of comparison stimuli (blue and white). Typically, when
delays are introduced between the samples and the comparison stimuli, differential sample
pecking, as well as food versus no-food samples, result in divergent retention functions
following one-to-one matching training (cf. Fetterman & MacEwen, 1989), but not following red
versus green samples. However, following MTO training with the three sets of samples, the
retention functions for red versus green sample trials resembled those on the food versus no-food
and 20-peck versus 1-peck sample trials. Specifically, the function for the green sample, that
occasioned the same comparison choice as the no-food sample and the 1-peck sample, was
relatively flat, whereas the function for the red sample, that occasioned the same comparison
choice as the food sample and the 20-pecks sample, was relatively steep. This pattern of results
suggests that red and green had been represented in a fashion similar to those of the other pairs of
samples – viz., in terms of presence versus absence. This retrospective representation account
certainly fits the observed pattern of findings much better that an unembellished prospective
account, which predicts parallel retention functions for the two samples within each sample
dimension. These data underscore the benefits of adopting a representational viewpoint, without
which these data would be difficult to explain.
Other Procedures for Creating Associative Classes
Common reinforcement history. An especially interesting case of the common
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representation of arbitrary stimuli was first reported by Vaughan (1988). In his research, the
defining characteristic of each of two stimulus classes was whether responding to the members
of each class (viz., stimuli which were randomly placed into each of two sets) was reinforced or
nonreinforced; this characteristic was repeatedly reversed across blocks of sessions as soon as
pigeons met a predetermined discrimination criterion. Because the overall reinforcement value of
each set was the essentially the same over sessions (i.e., the stimuli in each set served equally
often as “positive” or S+ stimuli and as “negative” or S

stimuli), the only feature that could be

used to distinguish between the sets was the reinforcement conditions that were constant within a
training session.
Vaughan first randomly assigned photographs of trees to two arbitrary sets: A and B.
After pigeons had learned that responses to stimuli in Set A were reinforced and that responses to
stimuli in Set B were not, the valence associated with each set was reversed until reacquisition
reached high levels of discriminative performance, and then reversed again, etc. After a large
number of such reversals, Vaughan found that early in a session (i.e., after a small number of
stimuli from each set had been presented), pigeons would respond appropriately to the remaining
members of each set. These data imply the formation of contingency-based associative classes,
given that once the current status of a member or members of a set was determined in a session,
animals then responded appropriately to the remaining members of the set, despite not yet having
experienced the reversed contingencies for those members in that session and despite the fact
that they shared no more in common (in terms of physical similarity and overall reinforcement
histories) than they did with members of the other class (although see Hayes, 1989, for an
alternative account).
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Jitsumori and her colleagues later deployed Vaughan’s reversal design in an innovative
series of experiments with pigeons further investigating a variety of issues in associative class
formation, including the role of perceptual resemblance (Delius, Jitsumori, & Siemann, 2000;
Jitsumori, Shimada, & Inoue, 2006; Jitsumori, Siemann, Lehr, & Delius, 2002). Further followup findings have been reported for dolphins by von Fersen and Delius (2000) and for a
chimpanzee by Tomonaga (1999).
Symmetry training. Having two stimuli associated with the same comparison or outcome
may not be the only procedure that can produce acquired equivalence. Zentall, Clement, and
Weaver (2003) asked if bidirectional training (A→B and B→A) will make those stimuli
functionally equivalent. The rationale for this procedure was that if directionality plays an
important part in the nature of an association (e.g., A always followed by B, or A was always
first and B was always second), then perhaps training the association in both directions might
eliminate its directionality component and yield an associative class which contains the two
nominal stimuli (see also Schusterman & Kastak, 1993).
In symmetry training, subjects learn that when Stimulus A appears first, it is always
followed by Stimulus B and when Stimulus B appears first, it is always followed by Stimulus A.
If this procedure effectively establishes an acquired equivalence between A and B, then one
should be able to train a new association between one of those stimuli (e.g., A) with new
Stimulus C and then show that an emergent relation has developed between the remaining
stimulus (i.e., B) and new Stimulus C. The design of this experiment appears in Table 8. Zentall
et al. (2003) found that such training produced significant transfer to a new association (61.2%)
when one of those symmetry-trained stimuli was associated with a new stimulus in a matching-
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to-sample task and the remaining symmetry-trained stimulus then replaced the first (see also,
Yamamoto & Asano, 1995).
Associative symmetry1 and stimulus equivalence. Associative concept learning also aptly
describes the findings of an extensive program of research on stimulus equivalence that began
with a now classic experiment by Sidman (1971). He trained a severely disabled child with
limited verbal ability to select the appropriate picture (B) of an object upon hearing the spoken
word (A) for that object (A→B) and to select the appropriate written word (C) for an object upon
hearing the spoken word for the object (A→C). Sidman then found that these two explicitly
trained relations yielded a new (untrained) relation C→B: The child was now able select the
picture of an object when presented with the written word for that object. In other words, training
resulted in [A, B, C] classes consisting of objects, the spoken words for those objects, and the
written word for the objects.
Sidman and Tailby (1982) formalized the notion of stimulus equivalence in behavior
based upon the mathematical (set theory) definition of an equivalence relation. Specifically, an
equivalence relation among Stimuli A, B, and C is established by demonstrating three emergent
behavioral effects following training: (1) Reflexivity = matching each stimulus to itself (typically
inferred from a participant’s ability to exhibit generalized identity matching), (2) Symmetry =
following training to select Comparison B after being presented with Sample A, participants will
now select Comparison A after being presented with Sample B, and (3) Transitivity = following
training to select Comparison B after being presented with Sample A and to select Comparison C
after being presented with Sample B, subjects will now select Comparison C after being
presented with Sample A.
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For the present purposes, we wish to emphasize three points. First, “The study of
equivalence relations…leads directly into matters of classification, representation, and reference
(Sidman, 2008, p. 323).” Second, the transfer (emergent) performances that are observed in
equivalence relations tests also demonstrate the power of common associations (e.g., in A→B
and B→C training or in A→B and A→C training) in yielding associative concepts, despite
lingering questions about the necessity or value of representational or mediational accounts of
such transfer (e.g., Sidman, 1994, pp. 110-117; Sidman, Cresson, & Willson-Morris, 1974).
Third, and perhaps most importantly: “Symmetry precepts are always involved with
categorization, with classification (Wade, 2006, p. 1).”
Not surprisingly, then, the “search for symmetry” in nonhuman animals (LionelloDeNolf, 2009; Lionello-DeNolf & Urcuioli, 2002; Sidman et al., 1982) has long occupied the
attention of researchers interested in animal conceptual behavior and, until recently, has been an
especially elusive phenomenon (although see Schusterman & Kastak, 2003; Yamamoto &
Asano, 1995).
A large part of the reason for this elusiveness has been the misidentification of the
effective or functional stimulus for the animal, something which does not necessarily correspond
to the experimenter’s definition (McIlvane et al., 2000). For instance, for pigeons and monkeys,
where a stimulus appears (viz., its spatial location) is an important component of the functional
stimulus (Iversen et al. 1986, Lionello & Urcuioli, 1998). Consequently, when the samples and
comparisons of an arbitrary (A→B) matching task switch locations during a symmetry test
(B→A), the animal essentially encounters novel stimuli: In other words, B on the center key (as
a sample) is not the same stimulus, despite appearances to us, as B on the side key (as a
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comparison). Similarly, when a stimulus appears within a trial is also important (cf. Zentall,
1996), as indicated by other findings in both the Pavlovian and operant conditioning literatures
(e.g., Balsam & Gallistel, 2008; D’Amato & Colombo, 1988; Honig, 1981; Miller & Barnet,
1993; Terrace, 1986).
These considerations are germane to recent successful demonstrations of symmetry in
pigeons (Frank & Wasserman, 2005a; Urcuioli, 2008a, Experiment 3) using successive or go/nogo matching to sample (Wasserman, 1976; see also Konorski, 1957). In successive matching,
only one comparison is presented after the sample on each trial and that comparison appears at
the same location as the preceding sample. This procedure avoids any changes in stimulus
location when shifting from training to testing and it also ensures the same requisite (viz.,
successive) discriminations between samples and between comparisons (cf. Saunders & Green,
1999). The task involves reinforcing responding to one comparison after one sample but not after
the other, and vice versa for responding to the alternative comparison. Each comparison is
presented for an extended period of time (e.g., 5 or 10 sec) so that the rate of responding to it can
be assessed, and one main measure of discriminative performance is the difference in the rate of
responding to the comparisons on reinforced trials versus nonreinforced trials.
Frank and Wasserman (2005a) and Urcuioli (2008a, Experiment 3) concurrently trained
pigeons on arbitrary (A→B) successive matching and on two identity successive matching tasks
involving the stimuli appearing in the arbitrary task (viz., A→A and B→B matching). Thus, not
only did this training ensure that each nominal stimulus was seen both as a sample and as a
comparison prior to symmetry (B→A) testing, but it arranged for common associations among
the various matching stimuli (cf. Frank, 2007). Specifically, the A and B comparisons were both
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associated with the A samples (viz., via A→B and A→A training) and the A and B samples were
both associated with the B comparisons (viz., via A→B and B→B training). The net result (see
Figure 6) was that on subsequent, nonreinforced symmetry probe trials (B→A), pigeons
responded more frequently to the comparisons on probes that were the reverse of the reinforced
baseline (A→B) relations than to the comparisons on probes that were the reverse of the
nonreinforced baseline (A→B) relations. In other words, new relations had emerged from the
explicitly trained (baseline) relations. Interestingly, these demonstrations of associative
symmetry in pigeons appear to directly contradict Relational Frame Theory, given its assertion
that a history of such arbitrary applicable relational responding (in this case, of “mutual
entailment”) is necessary to observe emergent symmetrical responding (e.g., Barnes, 1994).
Mutual entailment means that “A related to B” necessitates (“entails”) that “B is related to A”,
symmetry being one (albeit not the only) example of it. According to Relational Frame Theory,
prior reinforced experience with different examples of symmetrical relations is required in order
to observe emergent symmetry. Clearly, in our demonstrations, there was no such history.
Urcuioli (2008a) has proposed a theory of pigeons’ stimulus-class formation to explain
these results and to successfully predict other emergent stimulus control effects (e.g., Urcuioli,
2008a, Experiment 4; Sweeney & Urcuioli, 2010). Although non-mediational in nature, the
theory nonetheless derives its predictive power from the idea that common sample and
comparison associations generate classes that contain the elements necessary for the emergence
of symmetry and other derived stimulus relations. In other words, those common associations
yield associative concepts or classes whose elements are stimuli that are hypothesized to consist
of the nominal stimulus itself (e.g., red), when it appears in a matching trial (viz., first as a
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sample or second as a comparison), and where it appears (e.g., on the center key – cf. Swisher &
Urcuioli, 2013).
Conclusions
The experiments described in this review suggest that MTO matching and related
procedures result in the development of emergent relations between samples associated with a
common comparison that can be described as acquired equivalence or associative concepts.
Perhaps the most convincing evidence of these associative concepts comes from the results of
transfer of training procedures in which, following many-to-one matching and the reassignment
of some of the original samples to new comparisons, emergent relations can be shown to have
developed between the remaining samples and the new comparison stimuli. These emergent
relations direct the organism to correct comparison alternatives that have never before been
given in the presence of the remaining sample stimuli. Further research has indicated that the
nature of the associative concept is likely to be a common representation of the different sample
stimuli that were associated with the same comparison stimulus. Learned stimulus equivalences
of this sort would appear to be foundational to what cognitive psychologists have termed
superordinate concepts.
There is also evidence that acquired equivalence is not unique to the MTO matching
procedure. It has also been found following symmetry training and following Vaughan’s (1988)
multiple-reversal procedure. Thus, the development of associative classes is a robust and general
phenomenon in the nonhuman animal literature.
Formal equivalence – a special case of emergent stimulus relations involving reflexivity,
symmetry, and transitivity – appears to have been difficult to demonstrate in pigeons; however,

Associative Concept Learning 34
this failure may result from the fact that a stimulus that appears as a sample need not be the same
as a stimulus that appears as a comparison, either in its spatial or in its temporal location. Once
that fact is taken into account, good evidence for symmetry can readily be demonstrated.
The defining feature of an associative class is that members of such a class are related
arbitrarily (e.g., an object and its various symbolic representations) and membership must be
acquired through training. This feature provides associative classes with a flexibility that makes
them suitable for use with human language. The great advantage that associative classes provide
is that once an associative class has been formed, if a new response is learned to one member of
the class, then that new response should generalize to the other members of that class. The
research with animals suggests that the ability to form associative classes is not unique to
humans. Thus, these building blocks of language, arguably one of the abilities that distinguishes
humans from other animals (at least quantitatively), is well developed in other animals too.
Coda
We began our consideration of different kinds of concepts by discussing perceptual
concepts. Such concepts are not arbitrary or contrived for convenience, but real. To use Plato’s
famous words, they “cut nature at its joints.” Critically, Quine (1969) believed similarity to be
the bedrock of perceptual concepts. According to Quine, both humans and animals possess an
innate standard of similarity; he further asserted that standard to be absolutely animal in its lack
of intellectual status. This analysis suggests that, although both humans and animals might form
and use perceptual concepts, perhaps only humans might form and use associative concepts,
where something more intellectually advanced that mere similarity must come into play.
The research that we have reviewed here argues against that human-animal distinction:
animals can indeed acquire and adaptively deploy associative concepts. If we theorize that
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humans contrive such concepts for functional convenience, then there is no reason to believe that
the associative mechanisms that permit such adaptive conceptualization are not shared by
animals as well. Fully understanding and appreciating the role of associative concepts in
behavior will require a comparative understanding of their participation in the adaptive actions of
both humans and animals.
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Table 1
Many-to-One Transfer Design (after Urcuioli, Zentall, Jackson-Smith, & Steirn, 1989).

Original Training

Interim Training

R→V

R→C

G→H

G→D

Test

V→V

V→C

H→H

H→D

Note. R = red, G = green, V = three vertical white lines, H = three horizontal white lines, C = a
white line-drawn circle, D = a white dot. All lines and shapes were projected on a black
background. For each trial type, the first letter represents the sample and the second the correct
comparison. In Test, samples from Original Training that were not presented in Interim training
were presented with the comparisons from Interim Training.

Associative Concept Learning 55

Table 2
Many-to-one Transfer Design; Interference/Facilitation (after Zentall, Sherburne, & Urcuioli
1993).
Test

Original Training Interim Training Delay Training
R→V

R→C

R——C

R--------C

R—V—C

R—H—C

G→H

G→D

G——D

G--------D

G—H—D

G—V—D

V→V
H→H

Note. R = red, G = green, V = three vertical white lines, H = three horizontal white lines, C = a
white line-drawn circle, D = a white dot. All lines and shapes were projected on a black
background. For each trial type, the first letter represents the sample and the second the correct
comparison. In test, samples from Phase 1 that were not presented in Phase 2 were presented
with the comparisons from Phase 2 and reinforced responding was either consistent with or
inconsistent with the presumed common representations.

Associative Concept Learning 56
Table 3
Sample Discriminability Design Following Many-to-One Matching (after Kaiser, Sherburne,
Steirn, & Zentall. 1997).

Train

Transfer
Consistent

Inconsistent

R→C

R+

R+

G→D

G-

G-

V→C

V+

V-

H→D

H-

H+
.

Note. R = red, G = green, V = three vertical black lines, H = three horizontal
black lines, C = a line-drawn circle, D = a 2mm dot. All lines and shapes were projected
on a black background. For each trial type the first letter represents the sample and the
second the correct comparison. The transfer test for Group Consistent consisted of simple
successive discrimination in which the samples presumed to represent one stimulus class
were discriminated from the samples presumed to represent the other stimulus class. The
transfer test for Group Inconsistent consisted of a similar simple successive
discrimination but one sample from each presumed stimulus class had to be discriminated
from the other sample in its presumed class.
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Table 4
Many-to-One Partial Versus Total Reversal (after Zentall, Sherburne, Steirn, Randall, Roper, &
Urcuioli, 1992).

Original Training

Reversal
Partial Reversal

Total Reversal

All Groups

Group Hue

Group Line

Group Hue-Line

R→C

R→D

R→C

R→D

G→D

G→C

G→D

G→C

V→C

V→C

V→D

V→D

H→D

H→D

H→C

H→C

Note. The first letter of each pair represents the sample (R = red, G = green, V = vertical, H =
horizontal) and the second letter represents the correct comparison (C = circle, D = dot).
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Table 5
A Prospective Mediated Generalization Account of Common Representation Effects in Many-toOne Matching.

Training

Testing

Original Training

Interim Training

R -“c” → C +

R -“c”=> B+

G -“d” → D +

G -“d”=> W+

V -“c” → C+

V -“c”=> B+

H -“d” → D+

H -“d”=> W+
.

Note. R = red, G = green, V = vertical lines, H = horizontal lines, C = circle, D = dot. “c” and “d”
represent circle and dot mediating responses, respectively, to the samples (R, G, V & H). →
represents associations formed during Original Training. => represents associations formed
during Interim Training. Thus, in Testing, V and H will elicit mediating responses “c” and “d”
and transfer of training should result.
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Table 6
A Prospective Mediated Generalization Account of the Failure to Find Transfer of Training with
One-to-Many Matching.

Training
____Original Training

Interim Training

R -“c” → C +

V -“c” => C+

G -“d” → D +

H -“d” => D+

Testing

R -“b” → B+

V -“c”=> (B+)

G -“w” → W+

H –“d”=> (W+)
.

Note. R = red, G = green, V = vertical lines, H = horizontal lines, C = circle, D = dot. “r”, “g”,
“v”, and “h” represent red, green, vertical, and horizontal mediating responses, respectively, to
the samples (C and D). Dashes (-) represent associations formed during Phase 1. Double dashes
(=) represent associations formed during Phase 2. Dashes (-) represent associations formed
during Phase 1. Double dashes (=) represent associations formed during Phase 2. Stimuli in
parentheses represent the actual comparison stimuli in Phase 3. Thus, in Testing, B and W will
elicit mediating responses “r” and “g” rather than “v” and “h” and transfer of training should not
result.
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Table 7
A Retrospective Mediated Generalization Account of Common Representation Effects in Manyto-One Matching.

Training
____Original Training

Testing

Interim Training

R -“r” → C +

R -“r”=> B+

G -“g” → D +

G -“g”=> W+

V -“r” → C+

V -“r”=> B+

H -“g” → D+

H -“g”=> W+

Note. R = red, G = green, V = vertical lines, H = horizontal lines, C = circle, D = dot. “r”, “g”,
represent red and green mediating responses, respectively, to the samples (R and G, and V and
H). “→” represents associations formed during original training. => represents associations
formed during interim training. Thus, in testing, V and H will elicit mediating responses “r” and
“g” and transfer of training should result.
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Table 8
Design of Symmetry Training Experiment (after Zentall, Clement, & Weaver, 2003)

Training

Testing
Matching-to-Sample

Matching-to-Sample

Red – Circle Circle – Red

Circle → Yellow (Blue)

Red → Yellow (Blue)

Green – Plus Plus – Green

Plus → Blue (Yellow)

Green → Blue (Yellow)

Successive Presentations

Note - All successive presentations were followed by food. For matching-to-sample the first
stimulus represents the sample, the second stimulus the correct comparison. The incorrect
comparison is presented in parentheses. All stimuli were counterbalanced.
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Footnote
1

The meaning of the term “associative symmetry” and the term “symmetry” in the

stimulus equivalence literature is the same, and we use them interchangeable. In one important
respect, the term “associative symmetry” is preferable because it refers to an emergent relation
derived from associative learning processes (cf. Asch & Ebenholtz, 1962). The term
“symmetry,” on the other hand, can also refer to perceptual effects (e.g., mirror-image or
bilateral symmetry).
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Figure Captions
Figure 1. Transfer of training for individual pigeons demonstrating the class consistent
responding developed during many-to-one training (adapted from Urcuioli, Zentall, JacksonSmith, & Steirn, 1989).
Figure 2. Retention functions following matching training in which hue samples and lineorientation samples were associated with different comparisons (one-to-one matching) or
common comparisons (many-to-one matching ) (adapted from Zentall, Urcuioli, Jagielo, &
Jackson-Smith, 1989).
Figure 3. Following many-to-one matching training pigeons were transferred to a successive
discrimination in which responding to samples associated with the same comparison stimulus
during training were either both reinforced or not reinforced (consistent) or responding to one
sample was reinforced but not the other (inconsistent) (adapted from Kaiser, Sherburne, Steirn,
& Zentall. 1997).
Figure 4. Following many-to-one matching training, sample-comparison associations were
reversed for only the hue samples, only the line samples, or for all of the samples (adapted from
Zentall, Sherburne, Steirn, Randall, Roper, & Urcuioli, 1992).
Figure 5. Retention functions following many-to-one matching training in which red and food
samples were associated with choice of a vertical-line comparison and green and no-food
samples were associated with choice of a horizontal-line comparison (adapted from Zentall,
Sherburne, & Urcuioli, 1995).
Figure 6.

Comparison-response rates (in pecks/sec) on arbitrary matching baseline (Training)

trials and on non-reinforced symmetry (Probe) trials during the first two test sessions following
successive matching training involving hue samples and form comparisons (arbitrary matching)
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and hue and form identity training. Data are from two pigeons (EXT2 and EXT7) run in
Urcuioli (2008a) and one pigeon (PRF4) run in Urcuioli (2008b).
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